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This paper raises a simple continuous spectrum issue in many-worlds
interpretation of quantum mechanics, or Everettian interpretation. I will
assume that Everettian interpretation refers to many-worlds understand-
ing based on quantum decoherence. The fact that some operators in
quantum mechanics have continuous spectrum is used to propose a sim-
ple thought experiment based on probability theory. Then the paper
concludes it is untenable to think of each possibility that wavefunction Ψ〉
gives probability as actual universe. While the argument that continu-
ous spectrum leads to inconsistency in the cardinality of universes can be
made, this paper proposes a different argument not relating to theoretical
math that actually has practical problems.
1 Introduction
It is assumed that the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics refers to
understanding based on quantum decoherence, first pursued by Everett (1957)
[2] and later by the papers such as Zurek (1981) [4]. To say simply, in this
interpretation, wavefunction Ψ〉 = ∑k ak k〉 with ∑k |ak|2 = 1 interacts with
environment and reduced density matrix that recovers classical probability in
terms of Born’s rule is recovered when tracing over environment from original
pure density matrix. By this, one can interpret each k〉 as being possible uni-
verse, with probability of being in the world k given by |ak|2, Born’s rule. In
this paper, a universe would refer to a single possible world allowed by the Ev-
erettian interpretation. Thus a universe does not refer to the set of worlds.
The interpretation has clear advantage of not having to think about how our
world becomes chosen by probability mechanism, as one can simply say that
wavefunction, or “decohered” wavefunction represents the state of entire uni-
verses.
But is this advantage really tenable? When spectra of operators are all count-
able, this seems to be reasonable, as countable additivity of probability theory
is there - this will be discussed further in the later section. However, whenever
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we allow spectra of operators to be uncountable, thinking of k〉 as a different
universe is highly problematic. Unless one assumes that there are some worlds
privileged, the probability theory thought experiment demonstrates that the Ev-
erettian interpretation cannot match with what quantum mechanics predicts.
2 Continuous spectrum
It is known that integral must be used when trying to express Ψ in terms of
position state vectors: Ψ〉 = ∫
k
akk〉dk. The fact that any rigged Hilbert space
that describes a quantum system is a subspace of some countable Hilbert space
is therefore maintained, as one can always resort to a “good” basis. But when
one wishes to think wavefunction in terms of universes realized, different possible
positions should mean different universes - there is no intuitive reason why a
good basis is “preferred basis” for describing different realities.
This immediately raises the question of cardinality, since we have 2ℵ0 possible
universes when described in possible positions, or ℵ0 universes when described
in terms of a good basis. In such a case, it is certainly possible to say that we
instead have 2ℵ0 universes, that share some “property” of the world. (If this is
consistent understanding, then this proves that there needs to be at least 2ℵ0
universes in the Everettian interpretation.) But as one will see, this understand
has a fundamental problem.
Another possible solution would be to say that only countably many positions of
all possible positions are realized as universes by picking the set of computable
reals (for simplicity, I assume that position is one-dimensional). But the real
line is selected arbitrarily, and function x → x + k with x, k ∈ R with k being
some arbitrary constant should not affect qualitative results. It is certainly
possible to adjust k so that previously a non-computable real x is a computable
real x + k. The remaining possibility is to say that countably many universes
are picked randomly - but then the Everettian interpretation no longer holds
advantage over traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics.
3 Probability to a set of universes
There are also issues related to how one may assign probability to a set of uni-
verses. The question mainly is, since each branch/“universe” is equal, should
not we assign equal probability to every outcome, barring the fact that uni-
form distribution over a real line does not exist, necessitating the need to use
an improper prior, in case of continuous possible outcomes? One may easily
go around this by allowing several universes to share same outcome, but the
question of assigning probability, and in particular how Born’s rule is realized,
remains.
For a small subset of papers available, Deutsch (1999) [1] provides information-
theoretical argument for assigning probability, Zurek (2005) [5] discusses en-
variance and derives Born’s rule by quantum decoherence arguments. Sebens et
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al. (2014) [3] discusses self-locating uncertainty and also derives Born’s rule.
4 Does infinite cardinality matter in physics?
Discussions in previous sections mentioned uncountable and countable cardinal-
ity. But in physics, it may be the case that as long as cardinality is infinite,
different cardinalities do not matter. Rigorously, one does say that some count-
able basis spans a quantum system, but sans rigor one may say that position
state vectors do span the system, albeit with use of integral. This can be true
for traditional interpretations such as Copenhagen - though what Copenhagen
interpretation actually means has been different from a physicist to a differ-
ent physicist. However, I will show in the next section that for the Everettian
interpretation, uncountable cardinality matters.
5 Probability thought experiment
Assume that wavefunction Ψ for a particle satisfies |Ψ(x, 0)|2 = 1 for 0 < x < 1
and Ψ(x, 0) = 0 for rest. A wavefunction that satisfies above can be developed
by Fourier analysis - I will drop the discussion here. I will ignore time, as this
is not important to the analysis below.
Let X be random variable for one-dimensional position x of the particle. Let
y = f(x) = x2, with Y being random variable for position squared.
The probability density function (pdf) for X is:
p(x) = 1 with support (0, 1).
x = f−1(y) =
√
y, with dx/dy = 1/(2
√




Notice that g(y) 6= p(x). Let us now take the following thought experiment:
• Following the Everettian interpreation, each possible outcome is now an
individual world.
• But because of probability necessity, there will be other worlds that share
the same outcome (thus avoiding criticism that every world is equally
likely).
• Each world is associated with particle position x.
• Now x2 is calculated inside the world.
• But subsets of universes were assigned probability in the Everettian in-
terpretation. Since the universes that share some position x′ must have
equal chance of occurring compared to the universes sharing a different
position x′, it must be the case that just applying function f should not
change this probability, because one is only dealing with/transforming the
value! We only replaced associated x with associated x2, and f is bijective.
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Thus Y must still have uniform distribution. We know that this cannot
be consistent with quantum mechanics results.
(Observable for position can be referred as Xˆ, with observable for position
squared being Yˆ = Xˆ2, which follows matrix multiplication/exponentiation. Yˆ
and Xˆ obviously commute.)
It is then clear that the problem with the Everettian universe is the use of
uncountably many “distinct” universes. Continuum of real numbers cannot be
captured back into ordinals - here, universes.
5.1 Additional mathematical observations
To repeat what was said above, the Everettian interpretation requires assigning
probability on universes, that can be mapped to probability derived by wave-
functions. If universes are all equally likely, then this fact should remain so
when labels change from x to x2.
Everettians may, however, argue that “all universes being equally likely” is “ob-
viously true,” since each universe has zero probability, in case of continuous x.
Thus, one must discuss probability of universes being in the interval (a, b) for
label x or in the interval (a2, b2) for x2, say hypothetical Everettians. I will
argue that this observation misses the below mathematical point.
First of all, intuition that all universes being equally likely lead to uniform dis-
tribution (when location is localized to (0, 1)) is not really wrong. To see why
Y does not exhibit uniform distribution and why the paradox results from the
Everettian interpretation, the below formula is helpful:
y2 = (x2)
2 = (x + k)2 = x2 + 2kx + k2 = y + 2kx + k2
Assume that k is some real number. For any real x2−x = k, however small it is,
one can find that y2−y = 2kx+k2. 2kx factor is dependent on x, implying that
x increases, 2kx factor increases. Thus, when universes that were distinguished
by position x change label to x2, they actually have some universes “missing”
according to Y , and these missing universes affect probability proportional to x
each y maps to.
Thus, the intuition that all universes equally likely should map to uniform dis-
tribution is a correct one - and that changing labels of universes by a bijective
function should not affect probability of universes.
5.2 Density argument
Everettians may say that at position x, there are not really separate universes
but a continuum of utilities given by density. Does this argument the Everettian
interpretation?
Recall that all arguments explored in this paper so far against the Everettian
universe do not rely on distinct universes existing at position x. Rather, these
arguments required that different x should have some representative universe
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that is assigned some probability. And in order for the Everettian interpretation
to work, probability on the set of representative universes still must be consid-
ered, that is shown to reduce to probability deduced from Ψ. Thus density
argument still fails.
5.3 Can infinitesimals then save the Everettian interpre-
tation?
Recall y2 = (x2)
2 = (x + k)2 = x2 + 2kx + k2 = y + 2kx + k2. If k being real
caused the problem, what if one allows infinitesimals? That is, assume that
some universe at x = x1 + dx is not at x = x1. Then what was explored in the
subsection “Additional mathematical observations” does not seem to work, and
the Everettian interpretation seems to be saved.
But by symmetry then, it is natural to allow infinitesimals for probability too.
Why should positions only be allowed infinitesimals?
When allowing infinitesimals for probability, P (A) = P (B) where A is one
universe and B is some universe can be discussed in a clean way. This allows an
easy way to prove that when universes are all equally likely, this should remain
so regardless of any label.
6 Conclusion
The remaining concern is that for some pdf p(x), countable points may differ
from p(x) without really affecting probability of events. This, however, does not
apply for difference between the p(x) and g(y) discussed in this paper. Thus
this concern can be ignored safely.
From the thought experiment, the reasonable conclusion I derive is that Ev-
erettian interpretation needs to develop probability of events (for example,
probability of position of a particle being in 0.5 < x < 0.7) independently
of universes. That is, the Everettian universe must somehow dispose of the
concept of distinct universes. But if this is required, then it must be asked
whether there are really advantages in adopting the Everettian interpretation.
The main advantage of the interpretation comes from its ability to treat possible
outcomes as universes. This half-equivalence does naturally imply necessity to
assign probability to the set of universes. Alternatives may be developed, and
the author hopes to see the progress in light of this thought experiment.
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